In this letter, we analyze a class of recently proposed fault analysis techniques, which adopt a biased fault model. The purpose of our analysis is to evaluate the relative efficiency of several recently proposed biased-fault attacks. We compare the relative performance of each technique in a common framework, using a common circuit and a common fault injection method. We show that, for an identical circuit and fault injection method (setup time violation through clock glitching), the number of faults per attack greatly varies according to the analysis technique. In particular, DFIA is more efficient than FSA, and FSA is more efficient than both NUEVA and NUFVA. In terms of number of fault injections until full key disclosure, for a typical case, FSA uses 8x more faults than DFIA, and NUEVA uses 33x more faults than DFIA. Hence, the postprocessing technique selected in a biased-fault attack has a significant impact on the success of the attack.
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I. INTRODUCTION
C RYPTOGRAPHIC circuits are subject to a wide variety of cryptanalytic techniques. Fault analysis is a class of implementation-oriented attacks. They analyze the response of a circuit to a fault injection, with the aim of retrieving an internally stored secret variable.
The challenge in fault attacks is that the adversary needs to ensure that the actual physical manifestation of the fault matches the specific assumptions made during fault analysis. Such assumptions include the location of the fault in the circuit, the precise time of fault injection, and the specific value of a faulty variable. These assumptions constitute the fault model. Another challenge for the adversary is ensuring that the employed fault injection technique will create the required fault model. This is a challenge since, first, the resolution of fault injection techniques varies greatly. Second, a precise fault injection may be too expensive or complicated.
Recently, a series of fault analysis techniques have been introduced that are based on fault bias. Fault bias is the proportion of a circuit that experiences a fault under a given fault injection. Biased-fault based attacks can use relaxed fault models, compared to classic fault attacks. We discuss and compare several recently proposed biased-fault attacks, including fault sensitivity analysis (FSA, [1] ), nonuniform error value analysis (NUEVA, [2] ), nonuniform faulty value analysis (NUFVA, [3] ), and differential fault intensity analysis (DFIA, [4] ). We show that these attacks share common ideas, and hence, their efficiency can be compared. The efficiency of a fault attack is inversely proportional to the number of fault injections required to learn an internal secret. Therefore, we use the number of (faults, plaintext) pairs needed to extract (fully or partially) the secret key of a cipher. For the experiments, we have selected setup time violation as the source of faults, and a hardware implementation of the AES as the target design. We inject faults via controlled clock glitches. Our results are obtained from gate-level simulation, such that we are able to determine the exact cause of each fault. These are pragmatic choices that make our results verifiable and comparable with other efforts.
II. CAUSES OF BIASED FAULTS
This section briefly explains the basic concepts and causes of fault bias on path violation based attacks. More detailed explanation of these concepts can be found in our recent report [5] . The fault behavior of a circuit under clock glitch injection is determined by its path delay distribution and the applied fault intensity. For clock glitching, the fault intensity (FI) is inversely proportional to the length of glitchy clock cycle, . The nonuniform path delay distribution enables an adversary to obtain a biased fault behavior in proportion to the fault intensity.
The fault bias is a property of the circuit architecture, which expose the potential of a circuit to experience a setup time violation at a given fault intensity. Therefore, we can define the fault bias (FB) as the proportion of the violated paths for a given fault intensity. This definition enables us to quantify the fault bias as a number between 0 and 1 via Equation (1) (1) Equation (1) reveals two important properties of fault bias. First, the fault bias is a property of circuit architecture. Therefore, an adversary can accurately model the fault behavior in terms of circuit architecture. Second, an adversary can control the severity of fault effects on a circuit by controlling the fault intensity. Fig. 1 demonstrates the different effects of the fault bias on a PPRM1 Sbox implementation. The four different effects shown in this figure are the following:
Data-Dependency of the Fault Sensitivity: Fig. 1(a) shows that the path delay distribution of a circuit, and hence, the fault sensitivity is data-dependent.
U.S. Government work not protected by U.S. copyright. Small Changes in Fault Behavior: Fig. 1(d) shows that an adversary can gradually increase the number of induced faults by gradually increasing the fault intensity. Therefore, fault bias will cause a small change in the data.
III. BUILDING A BIASED FAULT ATTACK
In this section, we describe a generic framework for a systematic comparison of the fault attacks. Following are the steps of a fault attack. These steps are shown in Fig. 2 as well.
Step 1: Measurement: In this step, the adversary applies several plaintexts and all possible fault intensities to inject biased fault into the block cipher. Then, he collects the observables, namely, plaintexts, faulty/correct ciphertexts, and fault intensities for further analysis. These observables contain fault bias information of the circuit.
Step Step 3: Distinguisher: Only for the correct key guess, the estimated fault bias values in Step 2 correspond to the observed fault bias in Step 1. In this step, we distinguish the correct key guess from the wrong key guesses. For this purpose, the distinguisher first assigns a number for the strength of the correlation between the collected observables (Step 1) and the fault bias estimations (Step 2). Then, it selects the key guess which corresponds to the maximum strength.
IV. BIASED FAULT ATTACKS
In this section, we explain FSA, NUEVA, NUFVA and DFIA on AES algorithm.
FSA:FSA attack is proposed by Li et al. in CHES 2010 [1] . FSA utilizes the data dependency of fault bias. The attacker first collects plaintext, ciphertext and fault sensitivity points. Then, he builds by inverting in Round 10 for different key guesses. The attacker then uses the Pearson Correlation Coefficient to find the key guess for which for all inputs strongly represents the fault sensitivity behavior measured in the first step. The advantage of the FSA attack over other attacks is that it does not require the value of the faulty ciphertext. However, this attack requires a profiling phase before the attack to build the correlation between the data and the fault sensitivity.
NUEVA: Lashermes et al. proposed NUEVA [2] attack that relies on a biased distribution of error values. The adversary first collects correct and faulty ciphertexts. Then, he finds the error value for different key guesses by XORing the and to rebuild the error value distribution for each key guess. Then, he evaluates the Shannon Entropy on these distributions and can distinguish a correct hypothesis from a wrong hypothesis. The value of Shannon Entropy for correct key guess reveals high bias in the error value distribution, rather than random and weak bias for wrong key guesses.
NUFVA: Fuhr et al. generalized the NUEVA technique, by directly considering the distribution of the faulty secret variable separately. His technique therefore is called NUFVA, to indicate that the bias is present in the fault value itself, rather than in the error pattern [3] . Assuming that the fault injection target is the output of Round 9, the adversary captures several faulty ciphertexts. Then, he builds the distribution of the faulty intermediate values by inverting with different key guesses. Then, for each key guess, the attacker applies the maximum likelihood function on the distribution of intermediate faulty values to distinguish the correct key guess from the wrong ones. For the correct key guess, some faulty values are repeated more than others, however, for wrong key guesses the value of fault is random.
DFIA: The fourth technique that builds on fault bias is DFIA, proposed by Ghalaty et al. [4] . The attack is explained in the following steps.
• Step 1: The target of fault injection for DFIA is the output of round 9. The observables for this attack are the fault intensity and the faulty ciphertexts. • Step 2: Unlike the previous techniques, DFIA does not assume that the fault distribution or the faulty value is biased. Rather, the fundamental difference with the previous techniques is that DFIA relies on small change in fault behavior as a result of small change in fault intensity. To estimate the small change, the adversary computes the input of round 10 ( , ), by inverting the faulty ciphertexts and key guess for several fault intensity levels. Then, he computes the distance between the hypothesized intermediate variables by using the Hamming Distance function. • Step 3: The fault bias assumption for DFIA enables the use of a distinguisher that looks for the smallest change. Unlike the previous techniques, DFIA can combine fault behaviors collected at multiple fault intensities. Hence, the complete fault bias characteristic of a circuit can be exploited. Based on the assumption of fault attack, the error values are close to each other for the correct key guess. For wrong key guesses, the distance between injected error values will be random due to the nonuniform behavior of the Sbox module. Therefore, the distinguisher function simply chooses the key that shows the minimal distance between intermediate variables. The DFIA attack is also applicable on the time redundancy countermeasure on AES-128 using the same fault model [7] .
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this work, we injected biased faults into a device under test (DUT) through gate-level simulation. As the DUT, we use two Sbox implementations for AES-128. We generated the gatelevel netlists of the DUT for a Xilinx Spartan6 FPGA ( nm technology). The DUT computes each round of AES in a separate clock cycle. We use clock glitches as the fault injection means [see Fig.. 3(a) ]. This method generates a clock signal for the circuit as a combination of two clock signals, namely, glitch clock (clk_g) and nominal clock (clk_o). As it is seen in Fig. 3(b) , we inject glitches in the clk_o via an enable signal (g_en). To inject a biased fault in the input of the r-th round of AES, we set the g_en signal just before the clock cycle, in which the r-th round is computed. Such a glitch injection makes some timing paths fail during -th round and causes a biased fault in the input of r-th round. We control the fault intensity by increasing/decreasing the period of the clk_g signal.
As each considered attack has different requirements for the fault injection, we collected a large set of fault injections results to compare their performances. We repeated the following steps in our gate-level simulations for each DUT. We first generated 1000 random plaintexts. Then, for the rounds 6-10 of AES, we obtained the ciphertexts for different clock glitch periods. In this experiment, we gradually decreased the clock glitch period from to with step size. At the end, we obtained 154 ciphertexts for each plaintext and 154000 ciphertexts for each round. Next, we use these ciphertexts to evaluate the efficiencies of the considered biased fault attacks.
VI. RESULTS
In this section, we show our results for two fault injection conditions. The first case is the ideal condition, in which the target of the fault injection is a specific round of the AES algorithm.
In the second condition, we assume that the fault injection is in a noisy environment or the adversary cannot control the timing of the glitch injection precisely [8] . Therefore, faults might occur in the other rounds than the target round of AES. In this case, we randomly choose the faulty results from several rounds of AES and study the effect of noise in the efficiency of the attacks.
A. Results for Ideal Fault Injection
In the ideal condition, we assume that the fault injection tool is based on the clock glitching and the attacker is able to identify the location of the fault in the AES algorithm. Based on the requirements of the discussed attacks, we inject faults in Round 9 for DFIA, NUEVA, and NUFVA, and in Round 10 for the FSA, to retrieve the key of the last round. Fig. 4 shows the results of applying different attack strategies on PPRM1-AES.
In the first scenario, we start by obtaining the correct ciphertext. Then, we gradually increase the fault intensity until we observe the first faulty ciphertext at the fault sensitivity point. We captured the faulty ciphertext with this method for 1000 plaintext. Then, we applied four attack strategies to the set of faulty ciphertexts. The results in Fig. 4(a) show the required number of plaintext for retrieving the key. As shown, in this case, even if we do not have multiple fault intensities, the DFIA attack works with fewer plaintexts compared to FSA and NUEVA. The NUFVA attack is not able to retrieve all bytes of the key as observing stuck-at or biased faulty value with this method of fault injection is very difficult.
The second fault injection methodology is the extension of the first one. Starting from the correct ciphertext, we gradually increase the fault intensity for each plaintext and keep different faulty ciphertexts for each plaintext. We injected 154 levels of fault intensity for 1000 plaintext. Then, we applied four different attacks on these faulty ciphertexts. Each attack uses a certain amount of the injected faults based on its requirements. For example, in FSA, the attacker only requires the fault injections up to the fault sensitivity point. For DFIA, the adversary requires increasing the fault intensity up to the point of generating the last faulty byte. For each attack, we count the number of useful fault intensity levels associated with each plaintext to find the total number of fault injection attempts. Fig. 4(b) shows the results for the second fault injection methodology. The results show that the DFIA attack can retrieve the key efficiently with using less than 2000 fault injection attempts.
B. Results for Noisy Fault Injection
Assuming a noisy fault injection environment, we injected faults into rounds 6, 7, 8, 9 , and 10. Then, as the set of faulty values, we choose faults from each round randomly. Then, we apply the four fault attacks, and count the number of fault injection attempts it requires to find the key. Fig. 5(a) shows the number of required fault injections for each case. Since NUFVA attack cannot fully retrieve the key, the number of fault injection attempts shown is for the maximum number of key bytes that it can retrieve. As shown, DFIA is able to retrieve the key in fewer attempts compared to other attacks. The number of fault injection attempts increases exponentially for FSA attack. The reason is that due to the noise in the induced fault, the fault sensitivity point associated with each plaintext is for the data of the noisy rounds, rather than round 10. The NUEVA attack, is still successful when the rounds under fault injection are 10, 9, and 8, however, in the last case, NUEVA can only retrieve 9 bytes of the key using all available plaintexts. Since, NUFVA is not able to fully retrieve the key, to provide a fair comparison of the attacks, Fig. 5(b) shows the number of required fault injection attempts to retrieve only one byte of the key. As shown in these figures, the required number of attempts for DFIA is much lower compared to other attacks.
C. Attack Efficiency
In this section, we intend to compare the efficiency of the biased fault based attacks. The cost of an attack can be defined by the number of fault injections and the number of applied plaintexts used for the attack. As mentioned in previous sections, for each applied plaintext, we count the number of useful fault injection attempts. The attack efficiency in this letter is defined with the Equation (2) Attack Efficiency Plaintexts Fault Injection Attempts per Plaintext (2) To compare the attacks, we counted the number of fault injections and number of applied plaintext for each attack in two conditions. First, is the ideal condition that we injected fault only in the target location and second is the noisy condition in which we injected the fault in rounds 8, 9, and 10. Table I shows the efficiency of different fault attacks, in these two conditions for two implementations of AES. Since, NUFVA cannot completely retrieve the key, we provided the minimum number of fault injection attempts that it uses for partial key retrieval. Based on the results, DFIA needs fewer number of fault injection attempts compared to other attacks. The reason is that, the assumption on the effects of fault bias for the DFIA attack benefits from combining multiple fault intensity levels per plaintext. This property maximizes the information we can obtain from each biased fault injection and hence, helps to improve the efficiency of the DFIA attack.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this letter, we presented a comparison of four recently published attacks that use fault bias, the nonuniform response of digital systems towards fault injection. By investigating the common elements of these attacks, we were able to build a single framework that supports a systematic comparison. Our main conclusion is that, even though all of the investigated attacks use the same test case of glitch injection on an AES design, their performance differs greatly. Using the number of fault injections as the cost metric, we found that DFIA performs best, followed by FSA, NUEVA, and NUFVA. The main reason for the better performance of DFIA is the differential nature of the analysis mechanism. This makes DFIA more tolerant against estimation mistakes and noise effects. Also, DFIA can use the entire fault characteristic for a given input stimulus, in contrast to other fault injection techniques, which uses only a single fault per input stimulus. Overall, fault-bias based techniques are effective as an implementation attack, and they show that fault-injection based attacks can be applied in a generic setting with minimal assumptions on the underlying cryptographic implementation. It seems reasonable to conclude that there is a rapidly increasing need to develop countermeasures against fault bias in digital hardware, including firmware-driven embedded systems.
